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Abstract
Public managers need to interact with their political principals when managing cutbacks.
However, research on cutback management did not put much emphasis on this interaction.
We analyse how the interaction between public managers and political principals develops
during cutbacks, and how this affects cutback management. We analyse these interactions
between political principals and public managers as a public service bargain. This study
employs an in-depth qualitative case study on recent cutbacks in the Dutch penitentiary
system. The results show that cutbacks put the interaction between public managers and
political principals under pressure. As political principals feel that public managers’ loyalty
towards them is violated, they centralise decision making. Consequently, public managers are
withheld responsibility for cutback management. Strong resistance to cutbacks from public
managers and subsequent political uproar leads to both actors having to find a new balance
in the bargain. Furthermore, it leads to changes in both the content (what is cut back back)
and the process (how are cutbacks decided upon and implemented) of cutback management.
The first conclusion of this study and our contribution to the cutback management literature
is that if we want to understand the work and behaviour of public managers during cutbacks,
we cannot neglect the political context public managers work in. Second, we contribute to
the literature on PSBs, as we conclude that cutbacks, even if they do not impact the insti-
tutional, formal part of the bargain, have the potential to affect public service bargains and
thus, the interactions between public managers and political principals.
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Introduction
The ﬁnancial crisis that erupted in 2008 forced many governments throughout the
world to implement cutbacks. Financial decline may transform organizations to
political arenas (Mintzberg, 1985) where public managers and political principals
face the diﬃcult task of ﬁnding ways to manage cutbacks, especially since public
organizations cannot easily choose to stop their services (Levine, 1979) and
demands for high-quality public service remain ever-present. Research on cut-
back management shows that cutbacks often leads to centralised decision-
making (Raudla et al., 2015), with only the key political and administrative
leaders (i.e. public managers) involved.
Cutback management research acknowledges that the interaction between
public managers and political principals is important to understand cutback
management (Cepiku et al., 2016; Kickert and Randma-Liiv, 2017). Both public
managers and political superiors can be assumed to be strategic and goal-oriented
actors (Kuipers et al., 2014) whose strategic interaction can inﬂuence cutback man-
agement and each actor’s role within such processes. So far, cutback management
research taking the political-administrative context into account tends to focus on
issues such as ﬁscal consolidation at the macro-level, rather than addressing the
managerial challenges that come with cutbacks (Schmidt et al., 2017). This study,
therefore, asks a twofold question: how does the strategic interaction between pol-
itical principals and public managers develop during cutbacks, and how does this
aﬀect the cutback management process? This study’s ﬁrst and primary aim is to con-
tribute to cutback management, by studying how the interaction between political
principals and public managers aﬀects cutback management.
We analyse the strategic interactions between political principals and public
managers as a public service bargain (PSB). PSBs refer to ‘‘explicit or implicit
agreements between public servants -the civil or uniformed services of the state-
and those they serve’’ (Hood and Lodge, 2006: 6) and capture the formal and
informal relationship between public managers and political principals. Changes
in bargains can be the result of changes in the environment (Salomonsen and
Knudsen, 2011). Especially crises, such as cutbacks, represent ‘‘the hour of the
executive’’ (Lodge and Wegrich, 2012: 2) and have a strong potential to aﬀect
PSBs. Next to contributing to cutback management, our second aim is to contrib-
ute to theory development on PSBs by giving insight into how PSBs develop in the
context of cutbacks.
A single case study of cutbacks at the Dutch Custodial Institutions Agency
(DJI)1 is used to capture the interconnectedness of the diﬀerent concepts and to
generate a rich and detailed study of the interface between politics and bureaucracy
(Rubin and Baker, 2018). The case of DJI is an insightful case for studying
political-administrative interactions, as public managers in this organization were
confronted with cutbacks of more than 25% of the budget. Cutting back on prisons
is regarded as a highly political issue in the Netherlands, because safety is high on
the political agenda, and because prisons are major employers, especially in the
periphery. In such a case, public managers and political principals need to act
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together during cutback management, thus making it a useful case to study poli-
tical-administrative interactions during cutbacks. We focus on two strategic inter-
actions: interactions of political principals with public managers working at
DJI, and between political principals and prison directors, as both groups
of public managers need to interact with political principals in the cutback man-
agement process.
Conceptual framework
PSBs
Political-administrative relationships are considered a ‘‘vital but delicate part of the
fabric of government’’ (‘t Hart and Wille, 2006: 143) and therefore regarded as one of
the key themes of political science and public administration (Aberbach and
Rockman, 1988, 2006; Svara, 2006). Within the literature, the conceptualisation of
political-administrative relationships takes diﬀerent forms and emphases (Peters,
2016), such as role divisions (Aberbach et al., 1981), working relationships (‘t Hart
and Wille, 2006), loyalties (De Graaf, 2011), and bargains (Bourgault and Van
Dorpe, 2013; Hood, 2002; Hood and Lodge, 2006; Van der Meer et al., 2013).
We follow Peters (2016) who argues that the strategic interactions between pol-
itical principals and public managers are a ‘‘complex political game balancing a
number of objectives and utilizing a variety of resources for bargaining’’ (Peters,
2016: 147). The bargain between public managers and political principals is a give-
and-take relationship, where the actors have to ﬁnd a balance between the induce-
ments they receive in exchange for the contributions they deliver. The PSB, in this
regard, functions as the ‘‘terms of engagement between government bureaucrats
and those whom they serve’’ (Elston, 2017: 85).
While the term PSB dates back to the work of Schaﬀer (1973), it gained
increased attention from public administration scholars more recently after the
development of the concept by Lodge and Hood (2006). The theoretical founda-
tions of the PSB are found in a combination of institutional theory and social
exchange theory (Hood and Lodge, 2006). As such, a PSB perspective combines
the strength of a historical intuitionalism with a strategic interaction perspective
(Hood, 2000). From a historical institutional perspective, the PSB captures the
rules and role expectations that develop in the environment (Salomonsen and
Knudsen, 2011), which can be enacted in legislation and therefore constitutes the
formal part of the bargain. From an exchange perspective, the PSB captures
the motives and interests of diﬀerent actors, related to the inducements they receive
(March and Olson, 1983; Salomonsen and Knudsen, 2011). The inducements of
political principals require a contribution from public managers (and vice versa)
meaning that the two actors are dependent on each other to fulﬁll their induce-
ments, thus having to ﬁnd a balanced PSB (Elston, 2016). The exchange part of the
bargain is often less explicit than the institutional aspects, and therefore seen as the
informal part of the bargain.
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PSBs can be divided into diﬀerent (sub)categories, of which trustee-bargains
and agency bargains are the two main groups. Within agency-type bargains,
administrative actors are clear subordinates of the ruling political actors and act
on their behalf. We speak of trustee-type bargains when administrative actors
act independently of political actors. Within these broad categories, subcategories
of bargains exist.2
Dimensions of the PSB
Both trustee-type and agency-type bargains have three dimensions underlying the
PSB, as identiﬁed by Hood and Lodge (2006): (1) rewards, (2) competency, and (3)
loyalty and responsibility. How these dimensions manifest themselves depends on
the type of bargain that is in place. In the next section, we elaborate on these
dimensions, and conceptually explore how these may develop during cutbacks.
The rewards dimension of the PSB refers to the inducements public managers
receive in return for their work (Hood and Lodge, 2006). For public managers,
rewards can be monetary (for example pay and career opportunities) and enacted
in performance agreements and legislation (Van der Meer et al., 2013), but may
also refer to non-monetary aspects such as policy inﬂuence and prestige. Rewards
can thus be explicit and implicit.
In exchange for rewards, public managers oﬀer their competence to political
principals. Competence can be conceptualised as the knowledge, skills, and abilities
of public managers that political principals need to survive in oﬃce (Hansen and
Salomonsen, 2011). Competency can be more technical or specialist but may also
include the ability of public managers to help political principals navigate the
political landscape.
The role of competence and rewards has been described in various studies on
cutback management and, more broadly, crisis management. During cutbacks,
competence of public managers can refer to mitigating adverse eﬀects on employee
wellbeing (Van der Voet and Vermeeren, 2017) or organizational performance
(Park, 2018). To smooth the adverse eﬀects that can accompany cutbacks, political
principals have to rely on the leadership behaviour of their public managers. At the
same time, if public managers are self-interested actors who want to maximise their
inﬂuence and the prestige of their function or organisation, then cutting back one’s
organisation harms the non-monetary aspects of rewards (Raudla et al., 2015), and
therefore cooperating with cutbacks is doubtful. A counterargument to this idea of
the budget-maximising public manager is that gaining a reputation as a budget-
cutter rather than budget maximiser may be helpful in securing promotions
(Sigelman, 1986). Another critique of the view of public managers as budget maxi-
misers focuses on the core premise of self-interest as the core motivator of public
managers. As political principals themselves may also have a strong self-interest in
budget maximisation and strategic prioritisation of particular policy areas
(Moynihan and Andrews, 2010), the view of political principals passively accepting
public managers’ advice on budgets is somewhat naive (Moynihan, 2013). In all, it
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can be suggested that public managers and political principals will negotiate about
where and what to cut back.
The third dimension, loyalty and responsibility, consists of both inducements
and contributions. Hood and Lodge (2006) argue that public managers gain trust,
responsibility and autonomy of their organisation if they give up personal freedom
and the ability to act politically. Loyalty and responsibility can, therefore, be
conceptualised as the working relationship between political principals and
public managers (Elston, 2017), deﬁning ‘‘who is to be loyal to whom, and who
is responsible for what’’ (Steen and van der Meer, 2011: 223). This responsibility
includes who is responsible for the day-to-day operations of the organisation, but
also who is to blame in case of failure. Especially blame avoidance has received
ample attention in the literature, because of its importance for democratic govern-
ance (Weaver, 1986). What blame avoidance behaviour public managers and pol-
itical actors engage in, is likely to be shaped by contextual factors, though current
understanding how such factors shape behaviour is limited (Hinterleitner, 2017).
Loyalty and responsibility are especially relevant in times of cutbacks, as
cooperation between political and administrative actors is argued to be a critical
factor in achieving cutback-related change (Kickert, 2013). Crisis management
research also emphasises the importance of close cooperation between the two
actors (Boin and ‘t Hart, 2003; Boin et al., 2010). There is, however, a mixed
picture within the literature about who is responsible for cutbacks. Often, deci-
sion-making processes regarding cutbacks are centralised (Kickert, 2012; Savi and
Randma-Liiv, 2015) in order to force rapid decision-making and to avoid a para-
dox of participation (Levine, 1979): a situation in which involving actors in the
cutback management process leads to increased resistance from these actors to
cutback decisions. Such centralized decision-making can centre around the political
and administrative elites together, yet research also showed that in some cases of
cutbacks, career civil servants were distanced from the process of decision-making,
justiﬁed by arguments that public managers are part of the problem, precisely for
being resistant to change (Peters and Pierre, 2004). In cases where responsibility for
crisis management (i.e. cutbacks) is decentralized from political actors to public
managers, the aim is commonly to avoid (or at least obscure) potential blame (Boin
et al., 2010; Peters et al., 2011; Posner and Blo¨ndal, 2012).
In all, there are various ways in which the interaction between political princi-
pals and public managers can develop during cutbacks, which we analyse in the
remaining of this study. Before going into the methods and ﬁndings of this study,
we elaborate on the PSB as present in the Dutch political-administrative context.
Research setting
PSB in the Dutch political-administrative context
The Dutch PSB can be described as a hybrid PSB, with elements from both a con-
sociational and a managerial bargain, falling under the umbrella of trustee-type
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bargains. Originally characterised by a consociational bargain, elements of a man-
agerial bargain were introduced in the Dutch system in the 1990s. Public managers
in the highest echelons were no longer guaranteed career progression but had to
apply for new positions at least every seven years. At the same time, public man-
agers continued to be protected from dismissal for political reasons. Moreover, this
development negatively aﬀected the opportunities for political parties to exert inﬂu-
ence on top civil service positions, as appointment powers were decentralized,
and selection and assessment procedures professionalized (van Thiel, 2012).
The reforms led to a more managerial role for public managers. Diﬀerent authors
concluded that trustee/consociational elements still exist in the Dutch bargain,
which means that the Dutch PSB is best described as a hybrid (Bourgault and
Van Dorpe, 2013; Steen and Van der Meer, 2011).
In terms of rewards, the Dutch PSB used to have a structured pattern of
rewards, with a clear pattern of career progression (including progressive wage)
based on seniority (Bourgault and Van Dosrpe, 2013). The rise of managerial
aspects in the bargain made such clear career progress less certain, shifting the
rewards pattern to what Hood and Lodge (2006) call noblesse oblige. In this
case, the rewards of being in high oﬃce are the ability to have policy inﬂuence
and the prestige and power that come with such functions. These intangible
rewards make up for limited (and maximised) tangible rewards in the Dutch PSB.
Competencies in the bargain mostly refer to managerial qualities, as public
managers became professional managers rather than policy experts (Colebatch
et al., 2010). In addition, in the Dutch PSB boundary spanning (Hood and
Lodge, 2006) or the ability to move among and bring together diﬀerent actors
from within and outside government is an important competence.
Dutch civil servants are considered to be ‘serial monogamists’ when it comes to
loyalty, meaning that their loyalty is not bound to one political actor but to suc-
cessive ministers, from possibly diﬀerent political parties (Hood and Lodge, 2006).
While public managers in the Netherlands gained increased responsibility for their
administrative apparatus in the last two decades as a result of reforms in the Senior
Civil Service, they also got increased responsibility for mistakes (Hansen et al.,
2013). At the same time, political principals continue to be bound by ministerial
responsibility (Steen and van der Meer, 2011).
Cutbacks in the Dutch prison sector
Between 2012 and 2017, DJI was confronted with diﬀerent rounds of cutbacks.
Most importantly, the Dutch coalition government forced cutbacks of 340 million
euros on a yearly budget of 2 billion euros. These cutbacks came at a time when the
organisation already had a negative exploitation result for three out of four pre-
vious years, meaning that they were already looking how they could make sure not
to spend more than their budget allowed (Pollitt, 2008).
Furthermore, the organisation was not only confronted with a ﬁnancial
decline, but also with a decline in inmates which made closing prisons unavoidable.
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A decreasing number of inmates may legitimise cutting back on organisational
expenses (as service levels are lowered). At the same time, however, DJI was
forced to reduce operational expenditure across-the-board of the organisation,
resulting in having to do less with much less (Dooren et al., 2015). The cutbacks
of 2012 were far from the ﬁrst signiﬁcant reforms within the Dutch prison sector.
From the 1980s (the moment that DJI as an executive agency was created)
onwards, the sector was consecutively targeted by budget cuts (in the late 1980s),
major reforms to deal with cell shortages (from the late 1990s to the early 2000s)
and considerable ﬁnancial shortages from 2008 onwards.
Institutional setting
Institutionally, DJI is an executive agency of the Ministry of Safety and Justice,
which means that the organisation is semi-autonomous having its own manage-
ment board and budget, but still falling under full ministerial accountability
(Yesilkagit and van Thiel, 2012). The management board of DJI consists of a
general-director, deputy general-director, and directors each in charge of a speciﬁc
policy domain: the juvenile penitentiary institutions, penitentiary institutions (PIs
or prisons) and institutions for forensic care. As PIs are by far the biggest group of
institutions that fall under the jurisdiction of DJI, they also had to make up for the
most signiﬁcant share of cutbacks and are the focus of this article. The minister of
Safety and Justice is the ultimate authority concerning the activities of the DJI.
Besides a minister of Justice, there was a politically appointed junior minister spe-
ciﬁcally in charge of DJI, among other responsibilities, between 2012 and 2017.
Figure 1 gives an overview of the relevant actors.
Historically, Dutch prison directors long maintained a high degree of independence
and discretionary powers, sometimes described as being emperors of their kingdoms
(Boin, 2001). Their independent position made prison directors able to resist reforms
or, when reforms were introduced, to keep control of their organisation. NPM-
inspired reforms in the 1980s, aimed at increasing strategic control over prisons by
executive political actors, resulted in the creation of DJI as an agency yet did little to
enhance control over prison directors (Boin et al., 2006). Instead, the DJI headquarters
left day-to-day management of prisons in the hands of prison directors. Only after an
institutional crisis in 2002 (the result of media and public scrutiny after a series of
violent escapes and overall cell shortages), DJI was able to limit discretionary room of
prison directors. While their powers have been curbed somewhat, prison directors still
have a large degree of autonomy. This, among other things, makes that the relation-
ship between DJI’s headquarter in The Hague and the prison directors throughout the
country can be strung, especially during reform episodes. This is important, as we
know from historical institutionalism that reform history can shape current relation-
ships and aﬀect new reform episodes (Di Mascio et al., 2013; Pollitt, 2008).
In this article, we focus on the PSB between the political principals and two
groups of administrative actors: (1) public managers working at DJI headquarters
(level 3) and (2) prison directors (level 4). Both groups are pivotal actors between
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subordinates (i.e. the prison directors, and their employees) and political principals
(i.e. the minister and junior minister), and have considerable autonomy concerning
the management of their organization (van Thiel, 2012). This way, these actors are
in a position with considerable power and inﬂuence, thus resembling the charac-
teristics of administrative elites (Aberbach et al., 1981; Colebatch et al., 2010).
Methods
This study adopts a single-case study design. Given the magnitude and political
salience in the penitentiary sector, we consider this to be an extreme case. Extreme
cases lend themselves particularly well for exploratory research (Gerring, 2009;
Yin, 2009), and is likely to exhibit the key characteristics we are interested in
(Rubin and Baker, 2018).3
The primary source of data was 26 elite-interviews with (former) public and
political principals. Seven respondents worked as (deputy) prison directors, eight
respondents were public managers at the Custodial Institutions Agency (DJI), eight
actors were otherwise involved in the process of managing cutbacks (for example as
policy advisor or as top civil servant at level 1 or 2 for the ministry), one political
principal and two other political actors were interviewed. Each interview lasted
about an hour and covered the process of managing cutbacks from the announce-
ment, through decision-making, to implementation. The interviews were preceded
and complemented by an analysis of policy and parliamentary documents, as
second source of data (Patton, 2002) and used to select respondents for the
study and for developing the topic list.
Figure 1. Overview of different actors.
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Interviewing elites comes with several challenges regarding validity and reliability
(Aberbach and Rockman, 2002; Berry, 2002). First, access to elites for interviews on
a highly sensitive topic can be diﬃcult (Richards, 1996), though willingness to par-
ticipate in this study was high as the political principal resigned just before the start
of the data collection, and decision-making about the plans was ﬁnalised, thus
making the topic somewhat less sensitive and making elites open to participating.
Second, interviewing respondents about past events has the risk of ex-post rational-
isation (Ospina et al., 2017) and elites are well equipped to frame or spin interviews
(Berry, 2002). We tried to overcome both points by starting each interview by letting
all respondents explain how the process of cutback management evolved, and what
their role was in this process. This way, respondents started by explaining what they
did, instead of directly being asked why they behaved in a certain way. Furthermore,
the analysis of policy and parliamentary documents helped in preparing the inter-
views and checking respondents’ statements, thus serving as a data triangulation tool
(Patton, 2002). Because of the sensitive subject of this study, all interviewees were
promised conﬁdentiality. Except for the interviews with the political principal and
political actors,4 all interviews were recorded and transcribed ad verbatim.
Interviews were analysed using Nvivo. All transcripts were coded, using two
diﬀerent strategies. First, text fragments were assigned more general codes, based
on the literature. In the second round of coding, these coding-containers split into
more speciﬁc segments. In this round of coding, for example, fragments which were
previously coded as PSB were given a code reﬂecting a dimension of the PSB.
The second part of the analysis was the reconstruction of the process in the right
temporal order, to grasp the role of political-administrative interactions in diﬀerent
stages of the process of managing cutbacks. Respondents were classiﬁed according
to their role in the process and their position within the organisation to allow for
in-depth and contextual understanding of the empirical material. This way, we
were able to distinguish how actors in diﬀerent positions experienced the cutback
management process, thus also diﬀerentiating between public managers within DJI
and the public managers working as prison director,
Findings
To give a structured account of the cutback management process, the results of this
study are presented in chronological order. The process is divided into four phases
diﬀerentiated by important developments that changed the interactions between pol-
itical principals and administrative actors, and the dynamics of the cutback manage-
ment process. For clarity, we use the term public manager for those public managers
working at DJI, and the term prison director for public managers working in prisons.
Phase 1: 29 October 2012–21 November 2012: The PSB in place
The process of managing cutbacks started in fall 2012 after the installation of a new
Dutch government consisting of the conservative liberals and the social-democratic
Schmidt 9
party. Shortly after the presentation of the coalition agreement it became clear
for many public organisations that they needed to cut back on operational
expenses. Among them were the Ministry of Safety and Justice and its agencies,
such as DJI. As one of the respondents described, cutbacks were far from new for
the organisation:
We had a number of diﬀerent Cabinets throughout the years. With each change of
Cabinet, one thing is for sure: it results in new budget cuts for the whole civil service,
so including our organisation.
(Public Manager DJI)
Policy documents show that the total amount of cutbacks that DJI was confronted with
was the sum of cutbacks as imposed by government (this accounts for most of the
amount) combined with previous ﬁnancial shortages and a lower budget for oper-
ational expenditures because of a decreasing number of inmates. According to respond-
ents, it is common practice that the Cabinet’s decision on which public organisations to
cut back spending, is made without (much) participation of public managers. This was
also the case for public managers at DJI who did not have any say in the ﬁrst decision
to cut back on the prison sector, as made in the coalition agreement. DJI was quick to
look for options to cut back 17% of its budget. The political principals tasked the
responsibility for drafting potential ways what to cut back to the public managers
working at DJI. This responsibility included a mandate for both the content (what to
cut back) as well as the process of cutbacks (how to implement cutbacks). Concerning
the content, interviewees mention that it was clear from the beginning that closing
prisons (and in addition to that, laying oﬀ personnel) would inevitably be part of the
plans, due to the amount of cutbacks that needed to be realised:
(. . .) eighty percent of our budget consists of personnel expenses. So, if you want to cut
back on penitentiary institutions, really implement substantive cutbacks, then you are
quickly forced to look at personnel.
(Prison director)
Public managers working within the ﬁnancial department of DJI were strongly
represented in this process, drafting scenarios on how to realise cutbacks. Public
managers of DJI also chose to involve prison directors and personnel representa-
tives. As one of the public managers from DJI mentioned after being asked to what
extent there was participation in decision-making:
The junior minister surely does not know what to cut back. However, some measures
might be highly political (. . .), and therefore, such measures can be shot down immediately.
(Public manager DJI)
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The rationale behind involving prison directors and personnel representatives was
that people from within ‘‘the ﬁeld’’ would better be able to come up with scenarios
on what to cut back. This relates to the competency dimension of the PSB, as
public managers’ knowhow was needed to develop scenarios of potential cutbacks.
While political principals thus delegated the responsibility of drafting plans about
what to cut back to public managers and prison directors, political principals have
the authority to choose what to include in their proposals to Parliament, who have
the ﬁnal say. As one of the respondents explained:
There are a number of options: we can close prisons, we can ﬁre people, that is related.
We can also choose to cut back on forensic care. In the end, you make some scenarios
with diﬀerent options to choose from. Then it goes like: ‘These are the options, I am not
going to choose, that is not my responsibility.’ (. . .) You thus prepare political choices.
(Public manager DJI)
The quote shows that blame shifting by means of shifting responsibility from pol-
itical principals to public managers was not seen as a goal of delegating the respon-
sibility for managing cutbacks, as the ﬁnal decision would still be made by the
political principals.
All in all, within the ﬁrst phase of the process, administrative actors (public
managers and prison directors) were made responsible by political principals for
developing scenarios on what to cut back, while political principals kept the ﬁnal
say. From the PSB perspective, we can interpret this as the bargain being in place,
as responsibility for internal management aﬀairs is delegated from political prin-
cipals to administrative actors. While this last group acknowledges that ultimately,
formal authority lies with their political superiors, public managers contribute by
sharing their knowledge and expertise (hence their competency) to draft plans for
their political superiors on how to deal with cutbacks. Although respondents do
not make clear whether being involved in the process of drafting plans to cut back
would be beneﬁcial for themselves or (in the case of prison directors) for their
institution, inﬂuence within such delicate processes might be considered a reward.
Phase 2: 21 November 2012–22 March 2013: Loyalty from public man-
agers to political principals breached
A critical moment in the way that the interaction between political principals and
public managers developed was 21 November. This day, television program
Nieuwsuur broadcasted news that 26 prisons (almost half of the total number of
prisons) would close in the plans of the junior minister. This news was, according to
respondents from both political and administrative background, leaked to the press
by actors from within DJI and the prisons.
While the political principals did not conﬁrm these plans at the time (arguing that
‘‘many scenarios are still being considered’’), the process changed drastically.
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The political principals decided that only a limited number of public managers from
DJI continued to be involved in the preparation of the plans. Respondents asserted
that a breach of trust between the diﬀerent actors was central to this decision:
And the junior minister did not trust DJI either, as information was leaked to the press
multiple times while only a limited number of people was aware of that information.
(Public manager DJI)
One of the goals of centralising decision-making was, from the political principal’s
point of view, to get a better grip on the development of the plans. Also, by
centralising decision-making, political principals tried to reduce uncertainty
within prisons about whether they would be closed or not, as the ﬁnal decision
on which prisons would close had not yet been made. The result of this centralisa-
tion, however, was increased uncertainty for prison personnel, especially regarding
job security. While prison directors used to be ‘in the loop’ and could at least share
some information about the possibility of cutbacks to their employees, they were
now excluded from inside information.
The news about the possibility of closing prisons resulted in the mobilisation of
unions but also fuelled interference in the process by political actors outside of the
minister and junior-minister, such as parliamentarians, provincial politicians and most
notably by mayors of cities where prisons would supposedly close. In some instances,
prison directors had direct contact with these political actors and purposefully looked
for cooperation to increase the chances of their organisation surviving cutbacks.
Within this phase, we can observe how the interaction between political princi-
pals and public managers is put under pressure. Political principals reacted to what
they saw as a lack of loyalty from their public managers and prison directors, and
hence a break with a part of the bargain. In response to this lack of loyalty, the
responsibility of decision-making regarding cutbacks was withheld from (most)
public managers and prison directors. From a PSB perspective, the exchange of
loyalty and responsibility between the two actors was thus violated. The subse-
quent cooperation of prison directors with political actors other than their political
principals can be seen as cheating on this bargain, as such behaviour goes directly
against the PSB where public managers let go of their possibilities to act politically.
Being withhold responsibility for managing cutbacks also implies that one of the
rewards for public managers in exchange for their competency, namely (policy)
inﬂuence and a position within government, is being taken out of the bargain. All
in all, what started as a break with one part of the bargain, resulted in diﬀerent
inducements and rewards being taken oﬀ the table in this context.
Phase 3: 22 March 2013–19 June 2013: Increasing resistance to cutbacks
With the loyalty and responsibility dimension of the PSB breached, decision-
making continued. On 22 March 2013, junior minister Fred Teeven sent his
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plans to cut back on prisons, the so-called Masterplan DJI, to Parliament. Media
were quick to announce that indeed 26 prisons had to close. The central message
seen in the media was that 3600 public servants would lose their jobs.5
The plans were drafted for Parliament, which had to approve the measures. Prison
directors were informed just before the public announcement of the plans, as the pol-
itical principals were afraid that the proposals would leak to the press once more. For
public managers at DJI, this was a diﬃcult time as they wanted to inform their col-
leagues, the prison directors, within the diﬀerent prisons. As one respondent argued:
I said: Fred [name of the junior minister], this is unbearable. The prison directors
argue that we cannot do this to them. We cannot keep our mouths shut until Friday
afternoon, twelve o’clock, about how this ends.
(Public manager DJI)
The quote also shows the intensiﬁed loyalty conﬂict that public managers from DJI
were brought in as a result of the process of decision-making. Public managers at
DJI are expected to show loyalty to their political superiors, as part of the PSB but
at the same time, they also feel loyalty to prison directors with whom they fre-
quently interact. Having to withhold prison directors information about the plans,
put the relationship with prison directors under pressure.
While the junior minister and the prime minister discussed the possibility of
sharing information with prisons directors, the prime minister was, in the end, the
one deciding that information would not be shared before the weekly cabinet meet-
ing on Friday in which the plans would be discussed. From the junior minister’s
perspective, not involving any prison directors was a conscious choice, weighing the
consequences of another leak to the press on the one hand, and dissatisfying public
managers and prison directors by excluding them from the decision-making process
(and thus withholding them their responsibility on this matter) on the other.
The moment that the plans to cut back on prisons were sent to Parliament was a
tense moment for many prison directors. They knew that the DJI headquarters would
call and explain whether their institution would remain open. Once prison directors
were called with whether their prison would stay open, they immediately needed to
inform their employees. What previously was still a leaked ‘concept list’ of prisons to
close down, was now a reality. Consequently, the process of ﬁghting cutbacks intensi-
ﬁed. While the leak of the plans to the press can be interpreted as the administrative
actors ﬁghting cutbacks, the publication of the ﬁnal list of prisons to close was the
moment for many prison directors to intensify the struggle for survival of their prison.
Examples are giving employees the possibility to protest the plans, going to the media,
and lobbying against the proposals indirectly through mayors of cities where prisons
were supposed to close. While most prison directors did not explicitly state that they
fought cutbacks, they also did not support the decisions openly, even if their prison
would remain open. Prison directors argued to their employees that it was unclear how
DJI’s public managers and the political principals decided which prisons to close. Also,
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they felt that the measures that were thought of by DJI would be unachievable without
any loss of service quality and safety for personnel. Resistance to the plans thus aimed
at both the process of decision-making, as well as to the content of the plans.
Noteworthy is that much of the resistance against the decisions was directed at
the public managers of DJI. Some prison directors argued that DJI’s public man-
agers should have fought for a better plan and felt that they were the ones who kept
the directors of prisons outside of the decision-making process. In a nutshell, we
can interpret the situation not only as a conﬂict of loyalty between the political
principals on the one hand, and prison directors and public managers on the other
but also between the prison directors and the public managers of DJI.
In the previous phase, we showed that the interaction between public managers,
prison directors and political principals changed, as the bargain was violated.
This phase demonstrates how changing interactions between actors can inﬂuence
the management of cutbacks. The absence of prison directors in the process of
decision-making fuelled their resistance to the plans, jeopardised their loyalty to
political principals even more and, consequently, feeling little pressure to defend
the choices made by the political principals openly. The lack of support from
prison directors for the measures was the result of their dismissal of how the
plans were developed, as well as their disapproval of what the plans intended.
Lastly, prison directors had diﬃculties to temper adverse reactions to cutbacks
(from personnel, for example), as they did not know what was going to happen or
why their prison needed to close. It can, therefore, be questioned to what extent
prison directors were able to deliver competence to the political principals. All in
all, this phase in the process shows how a violated bargain between public man-
agers and political principals aﬀected the process of managing cutbacks.
Phase 4: 19 June 2013–10 March 2015: Regained responsibility for public
managers to deal with cutbacks
The third phase showed how the interaction between public and political actors
inﬂuenced the process of cutback management. The last phase starts, with the
relationship between administrative and political actors being damaged.
Opposition to the cutbacks kept rising until junior minister Teeven saw himself
forced to revoke his proposal temporarily. Already during the ﬁrst Parliamentary
debate about the plans, it was announced by the junior minister that the sum of
cutbacks would be lowered by 69 million euros (a decrease of about 22%), to the
surprise of both prison directors and public managers of DJI. Interviewees saw this
moment as proof that their resistance was rewarded:
If you look at the ﬁrst and second masterplan, then you can see that we had to cut
back 69 million euros less. I think that is really the result of the resistance we showed
to the ﬁrst plans.
(Public manager DJI)
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One of the results of being pushed back to the drawing board was that DJI’s public
managers again reached out to prison directors. In weeks before the debate that led
to putting the plans on hold, the association of prison directors had already pre-
sented their alternative for cutbacks within their sector, designed together with
employee representatives, although respondents diﬀer in their opinion on the use-
fulness of these plans. Prison directors were once again invited by DJI to partici-
pate in sessions on how to deal with cutbacks, as organised by the public managers.
These sessions were supported by political principals, who felt that they needed the
support of their staﬀ to be able to persuade Parliament to be in favour of the
cutback management plans. Respondents argue that these moments helped in
creating a plan that was bearable for all, also because the lowered sum of cutbacks
gave some leeway to mitigating diﬀerent measures:
We just looked for ways to implement cutbacks while keeping our vision and mission
alive.
(Prison director)
The results of these sessions were, most importantly, that 18 instead of 26 prisons
had to close. This way, more personnel could keep their job. In addition, some
measures which were deemed unfeasible and undesirable by prison directors were
also removed from the plans.6
In his defence to Parliament of the revised plans, the political principal thanked
prison directors for their input and argued that the new plans were an improve-
ment. While Parliament accepted the masterplan, sessions to discuss how to deal
with cutbacks remained an almost permanent activity. Contrary to how cutbacks
were managed in the previous months, public managers and prison directors
regained the responsibility for organising the process of how and what to cut
back. In multiple sessions in 2013, prison directors (and political principals) were
invited to share their thoughts, brainstorm about the future of the prison sector,
and on ways to realise cutbacks. These sessions resulted in concrete plans on how
to decide (with new closures of prisons seemingly unavoidable) what prisons to
close. In this new process, public managers and prison directors got a signiﬁcant
say in what indicators had to be of interest when deciding what and where to cut
back. As prison directors felt that it would be impossible for them to decide what
prisons to close, due to their shared loyalty, the ﬁnal say in what prisons to close
remained the responsibility of the political principal.
From this last phase, we observe how resistance to cutbacks let to public man-
agers, prison directors and political principals ﬁnding a new balance in the bargain
(and thus a renewed interaction). The restored balance was based on public man-
agers regaining responsibility for managing cutbacks, in cooperation with the pol-
itical principal. In return, strong opposition to the plans silenced, as the result of
the re-negotiation was more bearable to all. Thus, public managers again showed
loyalty to their political superiors. Particularly for prison directors, it was
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important that they could contribute to a better plan in which the vision and
mission of the sector could be upheld. With regained responsibility, came the
reward of being able to participate in decision-making about cutbacks. In return,
public managers’ competency was reﬂected in their ability to better explain to their
employees on what grounds decisions were made to close prisons, without making
such decisions themselves. This way, a new balance was found between prison
directors’ loyalty towards DJI and political principals on the one hand, and
towards their PI on the other.
Discussion
This case study showed how strategic interactions between public managers and
political principals came under pressure during cutbacks, and how a changing PSB
aﬀected the process of managing cutbacks. These ﬁndings have diﬀerent theoretical
implications.
First, our study shows that the extent to which the diﬀerent dimensions of the
PSB came under pressure because of cutbacks diﬀers. The more institutionalised
aspects of the bargain (such as pay for public managers as a reward) were never in
dispute. Yet, within this institutional setting, public managers and prison directors
lost their share of administrative power as part of the rewards. The loyalty and
responsibility dimension of the bargain was violated most visibly. Hood (2002)
argues that trustee-bargains may break down when political actors feel that
public actors ‘‘pursue their own interests too strongly relative to those of their
beneﬁciaries’’ (p. 324). Because political actors felt that the administrative actors
cheated on the loyalty dimension of the bargain, a breakdown of the bargain was
set in motion. Interestingly, earlier reforms aimed at changing the institutional
structure in which public managers and prison directors operated, did not result
in much change in behaviour (Boin, 2001). In our study, the behaviour of the
diﬀerent actors and their exchange does change, while the institutional structure
in which they act remains similar. Interesting is that changes in behaviour were
observed in a short period of time, while other studies have mainly pointed
towards the eﬀect of longer-term, incremental changes in behaviour that alter
the PSB (Lodge and Hood, 2006). This study thus suggests that cutbacks can
indeed be regarded as a sudden shock from the environment that aﬀect and reshape
(parts of) the PSB.
Second, this study shows that bargains do not only exist between political prin-
cipals on the one hand, and public managers and prison directors on the other, but
similarly between the diﬀerent groups of public managers. As explained, prison
directors’ criticism of the process was not only targeted at their political superiors
but also to their managerial counterparts within DJI. Prison directors expected
public managers to help them ﬁght cutbacks. This shows that there seems to be
a bargain between public managers and prison directors also shows that especially
public managers at DJI have to function as boundary spanners, in between diﬀer-
ent groups. In line with Hood (2002), it seems that a breakdown of the bargain
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between political principals, public managers and prison directors might be due to
a diﬀerent understanding of the moral contract or basic agreement between the
actors. This also resonates with notions of cheating, as it is often variable and fuzzy
what is perceived as cheating on the bargain (Lodge and Hood, 2006).
Third, the results show how political-administrative interactions aﬀect the man-
agement of cutbacks. The involvement of prison directors in the ﬁrst phases of the
process of deciding what to cut back, resonates with arguments from the cutback
management literature that involving actors from the ‘frontline organization’ (i.e.
prisons) in decision-making can beneﬁt the quality and acceptance for the decisions
made (Dunsire and Hood, 1989). The scenarios that were developed by public
managers and prison directors on what to cut back can be seen as an expression
of how their competency (e.g. their expertise) helps political principals with deci-
sion-making. The reward for such an inducement is that public managers have a
position with policy inﬂuence within government.
When the bargain, and especially the loyalty and responsibility dimension, was
violated, the decentralised process turned into centralised decision-making.
Centralization was motivated by an attempt to regain control of the process by
the political principal, and prevent another leak of information. While centraliza-
tion of decision-making has not been discussed as strategy to prevent leaks (Patz,
2018), leaking was clearly an instrument in the political-administrative struggle for
inﬂuence (Bovens et al., 1995). While centralisation of decision-making is not
uncommon during cutbacks (Raudla et al., 2015; Savi and Randma-Liiv, 2015)
or other crises (Boin et al., 2010), the role that public managers got to play in
managing cutbacks was diminished. Rather than the blame avoidance strategy to
transfer responsibility to others (Hinterleitner, 2017), withholding responsibility
was the strategy in this case. Especially for prison director, being withhold respon-
sibility might have helped them in responsibility denial of cutbacks towards their
employees (Hood et al., 2009). Due to the changing decision-making process,
prison directors were less able to mitigate eﬀects of cutbacks. From cutback
management literature, we know that the mere announcement of cutbacks may
already aﬀect employee wellbeing (Kiefer et al., 2015). These eﬀects can be miti-
gated by individual attention, participation in the change process and good com-
munication (Van der Voet and Vermeeren, 2017). However, as prison directors
were unaware of the plans, they could not help to clarify the cutback process,
demystify decisions taken, or explain what the future would hold for their sub-
ordinates, the target groups of services, or even to the wider population (Levine,
1984; McTighe, 1979; Raudla et al., 2015). This made it diﬃcult for public man-
agers to use their competency in making sure that cutbacks have the least pos-
sible damage to the organisation. The study thus shows the adverse eﬀects of
centralisation of decision-making. Prison directors were excluded from the deci-
sion-making process and afterwards, showed strong resistance to the cutbacks.
While the political principal, in this case, may have tried to avoid a participation
paradox (Levine, 1979), not including any public managers or prison directors
only increased resistance.
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Conclusion
This article focused on the strategic interaction between public managers and political
principals during cutbacks. The results indicate that if we want to understand how
cutback management processes unfold, how public managers behave in such situations,
and how it is decided what to cut back, it is essential to take the political-administrative
context into account, as this has consequences for both the process and content of
cutback management. This way, our study contributes to our understanding of cutback
management. Furthermore, the analysis shows that cutbacks put the interaction
between political and administrative actors under pressure, particularly the exchange
between loyalty and responsibility. This study shows that while the institutionalised
aspects of the bargain remained unchanged, the informal aspects of the bargain were
most visibly broken, and the loyalty and responsibility dimension were the ﬁrst to be
breached. Theoretically, this means that pressure on the PSB may not aﬀect all dimen-
sions equally but may have a diﬀerent eﬀect on diﬀerent dimensions. Another contri-
bution to the literature on PSBs is the ﬁnding that there seems to have been diﬀerent
bargains in place, between political principals and public managers, but also between
public managers and prison directors. Studies on the PSB usually focus on the ﬁrst,
rather than explicating whether there are other bargains in place, between diﬀerent
actors. Further research should also consider how interactions that exist between
public managers at various levels aﬀect the bargain between public and political actors.
Given the limitations of a single case study design, we should be careful with
generalising the ﬁndings. Future research could contribute by focussing on a context
with a diﬀerent PSB as a starting point, to enrich our understanding of how PSBs
develop when being put under pressure. Most importantly, we encourage public
management scholars in general, and cutback management researchers in particular,
to incorporate the political context in their studies, thus following the call by Milward
et al. (2016), as this study showed how bargains between public managers and pol-
itical principals can shape the work and behaviour of public managers.
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Notes
1. Since the Dutch name of this organization is DJI (Dienst Justitie¨le Inrichtingen) and this
abbreviation is used in its English brochures, we will use this abbreviation rather than
using CIA.
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2. See Hood and Lodge (2006: 21) for a full overview of the different (sub)categories of
PSBs.
3. As this study is part of a larger research project on cutback management in public
organizations in The Netherlands (references deleted for blind peer review), we
conducted an extensive ex-ante analysis that helped in deciding which case to
select for this study. The ex-ante analysis consisted of interviews with more than
20 top civil servants from different Dutch ministries, in order to gain insight in
what cutback-related changes were being implemented in these organizations. These
cases were then further studied by reading policy documents, budgetary reports and
newspaper articles.
4. Because cutbacks within prisons are considered a politically sensitive topic, the inter-
views with political principals have not been recorded in order to increase the chances of
them giving important information they would otherwise not give. Furthermore, two
interviewees (both from the ministry of Safety and Justice) did not allow the interview to
be recorded. The interviews helped in shedding a light on the process of cutback man-
agement, yet there were no transcripts to be analyzed and thus these interviewees are not
listed as respondents to the study.
5. A full overview of the different measures can be found in the Supplementary Appendix.
6. The Supplementary Appendix shows an overview of the differences between the first
plan without the involvement of prison directors and the second.
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